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CASENOTES
NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION V WILLIAMS: A LOOK
INTO THE FUTURE OF PROFESSIONAL SPORTS LABOR
DISPUTES National Basketball Association, et al. v. Charles L.




On January 24, 1995, United States Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit (the "Court"), in National Basketball Association v. Wil-
liams,' partially affirmed a decision of the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York,2 holding that (i) federal anti-
trust laws have no application to the collective bargaining negotiations
between players and teams affiliated with the National Basketball As-
sociation.3 In so affirming, the court decided, based on the inapplica-
bility of antitrust law, that it need not address the second holding of
the District Court:4 that (ii) the terms of the expired collective bargain-
ing agreement providing for the "College Draft,"5 "Right of First Re-
fusal,"6 and "Revenue Sharing/Salary Cap System"7 do not violate
Copyright © 1995 by Mark T. Doyle.
t B.A., University of California, Los Angeles, 1991; J.D., Santa Clara University School
of Law, 1995.
1. 45 F.3d 684 (2d Cir. 1995); 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 1531.
2. 857 F. Supp. 1069 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
3. Id. at 1079.
4. Williams, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 1531 at *2,*12.
5. The College Draft is the process by which exclusive rights to negotiate with eligible
college players are apportioned among the NBA teams. In general, the draft allows teams with
poorer records to select college players earlier than teams with better records. A player who is
drafted by a particular team may negotiate only with that team. Non-drafted players may negoti-
ate with any NBA team. National Basketball Association v. Williams, 857 F. Supp. 1069,1073.
6. The Right of First Refusal permits a team to match any offer made to one of its current
players by another team and thus to retain the player's services. The Right of First Refusal
applies only to Restricted Free Agents: players who have completed fewer than two contracts or
have fewer than four years experience in the NBA. Id.
7. The Revenue SharinglSalary Cap System establishes an overall wage framework
which provides: (i) total player salaries and any benefits paid by all NBA teams will be no less
than a specified percentage of revenues; and (ii) the total salary paid to players by each team is
subject to both a specified maximum and minimum amount. Id.
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antitrust laws because they survive scrutiny under the Rule of Rea-
son.8 The court instead focused on the applicability of federal labor
law to multi-employer bargaining organizations generally and to the
practices of the National Basketball Association Teams specifically.
Such an application was found to be strongly supported by legislative
history, clear congressional intent, and a lack of antitrust challenges to
multi-employer bargaining. These fa*ctors, the court concluded,
amounted to a strong indication of Congress' approval and promotion
of multi-employer bargaining organizations and practices as consistent
with the best interests of national labor policy.
I. BACKGROUND
The National Basketball Association is comprised of 27 member
teams, each of which was an appellee in the case at bar ("NBA" or
"Teams").9 Appellants were a class of present and future players of
NBA member teams, and the National Basketball Player's Associa-
tion, the exclusive bargaining representative of all players presently on
the roster of NBA teams ("Players" or "Appellants").' 0
For nearly 30 years, the NBA teams have bargained as a multi-
employer bargaining unit with the Player's Association. 1 Since 1967,
the NBA teams and the Player's Association have entered into ten
successive collective bargaining agreements ("CBAs"), the most re-
cent of which went into effect on November 1, 1988, and expired on
June 23, 1994 ("1988 CBA").' 2 In negotiating a new CBA, the Play-
ers demanded that three provisions contained in the 1988 CBA be
eliminated from any subsequent agreements: the "College Draft," the
8. Under the "Rule of Reason" in antitrust law, the legality of restraints on trade is con-
sidered by weighing all of the factors in a particular case such as the history of the restraint,
economic conditions of the affected industry, and the overall effect on competition. It is for the
finder of fact to determine whether the conduct of the defendant (appellee here) amounts to an
unreasonable restraint on interstate commerce, thereby constituting a crime under § 1 of the
Sherman Antitrust Act. The rule of reason is not applicable to per se antitrust violations e.g.
price-fixing, joint boycotts, etc. See also, Board of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S.
231, 238 (1918):
But the legality of an agreement or regulation cannot be determined by so simple
a test as whether it restrains competition. Every agreement concerning trade,
every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their very essence.
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regu-
lates and perhaps thereby promotes competition, or whether it is such as may
suppress or even destroy competition.
Id.
9. 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 1531 at *2.
10. Id.
11. 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 1531 at *2-*3.
12. Id. at *3.
404 Vol. I11
NBA v. WILLIAMS
"Right of First Refusal," and the "Revenue Sharing/Salary Cap Sys-
tem.""3 The Right of First Refusal and the present version of the Col-
lege Draft had been incorporated in all the CBAs signed since 1976;
the Revenue Sharing/Salary Cap provisions had been included in
every CBA since 1983.14
On May 4, 1994, negotiations between the parties regarding
terms and conditions of a new CBA reached an impasse, and the Play-
ers refused to negotiate further with the NBA Teams until the formal
expiration date of the 1988 CBA.15 On June 17, 1994, the NBA
Teams began the instant action in the Southern District of New York,
seeking a declaratory judgment.16 The Teams sought two principal
declarations: (i) that the continued imposition of the disputed provi-
sions of the CBA would not violate the antitrust laws because that
imposition would be "governed solely by the labor laws and is exempt
from antitrust liability under the non-statutory exemption1 7 to the anti-
trust laws"; and (ii) that the disputed provisions are lawful even if the
antitrust laws apply.18 On June 27, 1994, the Players counterclaimed,
asserting that continued imposition, after expiration of the 1988 CBA
by the NBA Teams of the College Draft, the Right of First Refusal,
and the Revenue Sharing/Salary Cap System violated the Sherman
Antitrust Act of 1890' because they were no longer embodied in the
expired 1988 CBA.20
On July 18, 1994, the District Court granted the NBA's request
for declaratory relief and dismissed the Players' counterclaim.21 Rely-
ing on Powell v. National Football League,' District Court Judge
Duffy concluded that the non-statutory labor exemption from the anti-
trust laws applied, and consequently that "antitrust immunity exists as
long as a collective bargaining relationship exists."'"3 Accordingly, he
held that the NBA was entitled to a declaration that the continued
13. lId
14. Id. at *4.
15. Id.
16. 857 F. Supp. 1069 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
17. The term "non-statutory exemption" refers to the fact that no federal legislation has
specifically exempted multi-employer bargaining from the application of antitrust law. Instead,
the exemption has evolved from a history of congressional approval, manifest in related legisla-
tion, and a resulting lack of antitrust challenge to multi-employer bargaining. This clear, if un-
spoken, congressional and judicial approval of multi-employer bargaining has come to be
referred to as a "non-statutory exemption".
18. 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 1531 at *4-*5.
19. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1890).
20. 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 1531 at *5.
21. Id. at *6.
22. 930 F.2d 1293, 1304 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1040 (1991).
23. 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS at *6.
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imposition of the College Draft, the Right of First Refusal, and the
Revenue Sharing/Salary Cap System provisions by the NBA Teams,
even in light of the expired 1988 CBA, "did not violate the antitrust
laws so long as there is a collective bargaining relationship between
the NBA and the Player's Association." '24
The District Court further held that, even if the NBA Teams had
no antitrust immunity, the Players had nevertheless failed to show that
the provisions in question were "unreasonably anti-competitive," or
that they constituted a violation of antitrust law.2 5 In so finding, the
court made note of the benefits of competitive athletic balance pro-
moted by the provisions.26 Accordingly, the District Court concluded
that the disputed provisions did not violate the antitrust laws even if
the non-statutory labor exemption were not to apply.27
The Players appealed.
III. DIscussIoN
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit discussed four sepa-
rate topics in affirming that federal antitrust laws have no application
to the collective bargaining negotiations between players and teams
affiliated with the National Basketball Association while also conclud-
ing that federal labor laws provided the parameters for legal conduct
of multi-employer bargaining practices by the NBA Teams. These
issues included the Players' Antitrust Claim and the NBA Teams' De-
fense; the Nature and Purposes of Multi-employer Bargaining; Anti-
trust Laws and Multi-employer Bargaining; and Labor Laws and
Multi-employer Bargaining.
A. The Players' Antitrust Claim and the NBA Teams'
Defense
The heart of the Players' claim was that the NBA Teams had
agreed jointly to continue imposition of the subject provisions2 8 as
terms and conditions of employment pending agreement on a new
CBA.29 The provisions were characterized as "naked restraints be-
tween competitors; they prevent competition; they fix prices; they sup-
press salaries."30 The Players contended that multi-employer groups
24. Id.
25. Id. at *6-*7.
26. Id. at *7.
27. Id.
28. See supra notes 5-7.
29. 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 1531 at *7.
30. Id. (citing Appellants' Brief at 11).
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should be barred from insisting upon, or using economic force to ob-
tain, the desired terms and conditions of employment.3 By acting
collectively to impose terms of employment after expiration of the
1988 CBA, according to the Players, the Teams were acting as a cartel
and committing a per se violation of the Sherman Act as horizontal
competitors for labor who had entered into what was essentially a
price-fixing agreement.32 In short, appellants' claim asserted that
multi-employer bargaining organizations, and the practices of those
organizations, were unlawful.
Appellants' claim clearly relied on classic principles of antitrust
law. The court observed that in this context and absent justification
under the Rule of Reason or some other applicable defense, employers
who compete for labor may not agree among themselves to purchase
that labor only on specified terms and conditions,33 and such a cartel
may not enforce its will through an agreement to boycott those who do
not abide by such rules.34 Such conduct by the NBA Teams, the court
reasoned, would indeed constitute a violation of antitrust law as
claimed by the Players absent an applicable justification or defense
asserted by the NBA Teams.3"
The defense asserted by the NBA Teams was a two-fold, alterna-
tive response; (i) the Players' antitrust claim was entirely trumped by
the legislative scheme governing labor relations in collective bargain-
ing,36 in particular by the protection afforded multi-employer bargain-
ing by that scheme;37 and (ii) even if the antitrust laws did apply, the
subject provisions survived scrutiny under the Rule of Reason because
the efficiencies these provisions afforded, in the way of competitive
athletic balance among NBA teams, outweighed their effect on
competition.38
Based on the respective positions of the parties, it was concluded
that relevant legal authority, including importantly the lack thereof,
strongly suggested that the antitrust laws did not prohibit employers
31. Id. at *8.
32. Id. (citing Counsel for the Players at Oral Argument).
33. Id. at *9 (referring to Anderson v. Shipowners' Association, 272 U.S. 359 (1926)).
34. 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 1531 at *9 (referring to Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers'
Association v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914)).
35. Id.
36. Id. at *10 (citing Powell v. National Football League, 930 F.2d 1293, 1304 (8th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1040 (1991)).
37. Id. at *11 (citing NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 449 ("Buffalo Linen"), 353
U.S. 87 (1957)).
38. 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 1531 at *11 (citing NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85,
117, 119-20 (1984)).
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from acting jointly in bargaining with a common union.39 Multi-em-
ployer bargaining had been commonplace and essentially unchal-
lenged, despite the existence of the antitrust laws, long before the
passage of the federal labor laws.40 Federal labor laws, moreover,
have embodied a conscious congressional decision to permit multi-
employer organizations to engage in hard bargaining tactics and to use
economic force to resolve disputes with unions over terms and condi-
tions of employment. 41 The court found that the Players' position ap-
peared to be inconsistent with the approach taken under the antitrust
laws regardless of the applicability of federal labor laws.42 Further-
more, in light of the fact that the position of the Players did in fact
collide head-on with the federal labor laws' endorsement of multi-
employer bargaining, it was reasoned that the Players' claim was de-
fective, and must fail.43 Finally, based on the defective claim by the
Players, and the inapplicability of antitrust law to the case at bar, the
court concluded that it did not need to address the various arguments
pro and con regarding the Rule of Reason.44
B. The Nature and Purpose of Multi-Employer Bargaining
The court noted that multi-employer bargaining was common
practice throughout the United States, literally involving millions of
employees and thousands of employers. 4 Furthermore, a series of
important purposes inherent in multi-employer bargaining was dis-
cussed. First, multi-employer bargaining helped to fortify the employ-
ers' hands by preventing a union from "whipsawing" employers and
shutting them down one-by-one based on the employer not conceding
terms to the union.46 Consequently, such bargaining allowed employ-
ers to form a common front as to terms and conditions to be offered to
a union and to confront the union with simultaneous shutdown of all
the employers should negotiations fail. Also eliminated were compet-
itive disadvantages resulting from differing CBA terms and conditions
offered by individual employers.47
39. Id. at *11.
40. Id.
41. Id. at *11-*12.
42. Id. at *12.
43. Id.
44. 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 1531 at *12.
45. Id. (referring to Charles D. Bonanno Linen Service, Inc. v. NLRB ("Bonanno Linen"),
454 U.S. 404, 410 n.4 (1982)).




Within the sports industry, multi-employer bargaining has contin-
ued to exist in part due to a need for the uniformity of certain terms
and conditions of employment for all teams in a sports league.48 For
example, the number of games, season length, playoff structure, and
roster size were among the uniform league rules typically bargained
over by leagues and players' unions.49
In light of the identified nature and purposes of multi-employer
bargaining, the court concluded this section of its discussion by articu-
lating the basis of the Players' claim in the context of these character-
istics. First, appellants claimed that employers (here the NBA Teams)
could not agree upon common terms and conditions of employment to
be negotiated in a new CBA, and could not thereafter bargain over
those terms, ultimately insist upon them, and even obtain them by
resorting to economic force. 0 In addition, appellants claimed that the
Teams could not continue to impose common terms and conditions
(the subject provisions) embodied in the now expired 1988 CBA. In
short, appellants were asserting that the most routine practices of
multi-employer bargaining, if not the organizational concept itself,
were per se unlawful.5 In response, the court noted that the very es-
sence of multi-employer bargaining was that employers jointly estab-
lish and maintain a unified front to deal with a common employee
union.52 That goal requires that employers be permitted to meet and
agree upon terms and conditions of employment, to pursue those terms
as a unit, and to act as though they were a single employer.5 3 Conse-
quently, it was concluded that the Players' claim was based upon the
simple proposition that the major purpose of, and the means applied
by, multiemployer organizations, were unlawful in and of
themselves. 54
C. The Antitrust Laws and Multi-Employer Bargaining
The court initially stated that the existence and practices of multi-
employer bargaining with employee unions predated the passage of
the Sherman Act. 5 Furthermore, during the succeeding 104 years of
case law, there had not been, prior to the instant case, an instance of a
union or individual employee asserting that the routine practices of
48. 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 1531 at *13-*14.




53. 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 1531 at *14-*15.
54. Id. at *15.
55. Id.
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multi-employer bargaining violated the antitrust laws. 6 While anti-
trust challenges in professional sports industries had at times involved
facts similar to the case at bar,57 the issue of multi-employer bargain-
ing had been raised in the judicial context only "obliquely," 8 if at
all.59
From a legislative standpoint, the court found that in as much as
Congress had considered the legality of multi-employer bargaining,
that it had uniformly indicated its approval. 60 First, in 1920, Congress
attempted in the Clayton Act to prevent federal courts from interfering
in labor disputes. 61 Though Congress was concerned with judicial in-
terference with employee unions, the statute was also created with the
protection of employer conduct in mind, including language that
would appear to permit multi-employer lockouts.62 In 1932, Congress
passed the Norris-LaGuardia Act, barring federal courts from issuing
injunctions against firms seeking to join or remain members of em-
ployer organizations. 6 The Norris-LaGuardia Act also used language
similar to that of the Clayton Act,' as noted above.65 Additionally, in
1947, Congress refused to limit multi-employer bargaining, conclud-
ing that such bargaining "was a vital factor in the effectuation of the
national policy promoting labor peace through strengthened collective
bargaining. 66
The court reiterated that the lack of an antitrust challenge to, or
Congressional action restricting, multi-employer bargaining for over a
century during which it prominently existed and flourished, strongly
suggested an understanding about the legality of multi-employer bar-
gaining which was fundamentally inconsistent with appellants'
claims.67 It was noted that the only case specifically addressing the
legality of multi-employer bargaining under the antitrust laws re-
flected a judicial recognition of a strong congressional intent, clearly
56. Id.
57. Id. (citing Powell, 930 F.2d at 1304); Bridgeman v. National Basketball Association,
675 F. Supp. 960,961-2 (D.N.J. 1987).
58. See infra notes 69-71. The only case law noted by the court to have directly addressed
the legality of multiemployer bargaining is discussed infra.
59. 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 1531 at *15-*16.
60. Id. at *16.
61. Id.
62. 29 U.S.C. §52 (1994). Section 20 exempts from federal prohibition "per-
sons.. .terminating any relation of employment.. .or withholding.. .moneys or things of value."
63. 29 U.S.C. § 104(b) (1994).
64. 29 U.S.C. § 104(c) (1994).
65. 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1994).
66. 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 1531 at *17-*18 (citing Buffalo Linen, 353 U.S. at 95 (discuss-
ing congressional debate over the Taft-Hartley amendments of 1947)).
67. Id. at *18.
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manifest in legislative history, of approval and promotion of multi-
employer bargaining.6" In that 1981 decision, California State Coun-
cil of Carpenters v. Associated General Contractors,69 the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals held in part,
... even if the antitrust laws had been interpreted so as to bring
multiemployer bargaining units within the scope of the Sherman
Act, the statutory exemption found in section 4 of the Norris-La-
Guardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 104, when read together with section 20
of the Clayton Act, 29 U.S.C. § 52, clearly exempts '[b]ecoming or
remaining a member ... of any employer organization' from the
antitrust laws. 70
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit held that while multi-employer
bargaining might restrain competition in specified areas of labor con-
ditions, such restraints "will not be considered to violate the antitrust
laws., 71
Based on the supporting authorities and legislative history, the
court concluded that Congress never intended for the antitrust laws to
limit or prohibit multi-employer bargaining with a common union.7'
In fact, it appeared Congress had long believed, and acted upon that
belief in 1947, that multi-employer bargaining was both an efficient
and necessary counterweight to employee union power.73
Finally, in passing, the court noted that the identified efficiencies
and necessity of multi-employer bargaining arguably fit within the
Rule of Reason analysis which permits "ancillary restraints" necessary
to a legitimate transaction.74 However, the court observed that
whether it might reach this result if it were "writing on a clean slate"
was not at issue in light of the fact that whatever doubts might have
existed as to Congress' intent in this matter had been entirely elimi-
nated by the passage of federal labor laws.75
D. Federal Labor Laws and Multi-Employer Bargaining
The court reiterated that to hold at "this late date" the features of
multi-employer bargaining as illegal under the antitrust laws would
"cause a massive reshaping of the institution of collective bargain-
68. Id. at *19.
69. 107 L.R.R.M. 2724 (9th Cir. 1981).
70. Id. at 2725.
71. Id.
72. 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 1531 at *20.
73. Id. (citing Buffalo Linen, 353 U.S. at 95-96).
74. Id. (citing United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271,282 (6th Cir. 1898),
modified, 175 U.S. 211 (1899)).
75. 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 1531 at *21.
1995]
COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
ing."7 6 Alternatively, an examination of federal labor laws was made,
and was found to provide the applicable parameters to multi-employer
bargaining practices and organizations in general, and specifically to
the actions of the NBA Teams in the instant case.7 7
Under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), employers and
unions must bargain in good faith over mandatory subjects of bargain-
ing.7 8 The court relied upon its own previous holding in finding that
the College Draft, the Right of First Refusal, and the Revenue Shar-
ing/Salary Cap System provisions, similar to those contained in the
CBAs, were mandatory subjects of bargaining as per the NLRA guide-
lines.79 Next, the court noted the settled law that employers may for-
mulate proposals to unions and insist upon the proposals so long as
they continue to bargain in good faith."0 Additionally, the court noted
the settled law that employers would be able to continue imposition of
common terms and conditions of employment upon reaching an im-
passe following good faith bargaining, and thereafter to resort to eco-
nomic force in support of those terms and conditions.8 '
In applying these principles to the facts of the instant case, the
court found appellants' claim that the NBA Teams may not continue
to impose the challenged provisions, even after good faith bargaining,
was contradictory to the NLRA guidelines and further that it placed
the NBA Teams in a difficult predicament.8 2 The subject provisions
were unquestionably part of the expired 1988 CBA. In meeting their
obligation to bargain in good faith over the subject provisions, the
Teams were then required to maintain the status quo (and continue to
enforce the terms and conditions of the expired CBA) until an impasse
was reached.8" Furthermore, upon bargaining to an impasse, the
Teams were free to maintain the status quo while also resorting to
economic force in support of the applicable terms and conditions of
employment. Consequently, appellants' claim that imposition of the
subject provisions violated antitrust laws as soon as the 1988 CBA




78. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1994).
79. 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 1531 at *22 (citing Wood v. National Basketball Association,
809 F.2d 954, 962 (2d Cir. 1987)).
80. Id. (citing Fibreboard Paper Products Corporation v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 210
(1964)).
81. Id. (citing First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 675 (1981)).
82. 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 1531 at *23.
83. Id. (citing NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962)).
84. See supra notes 78-81.
[Vol. I11
NBA v. WILLIAMS
In finding that the practices of the NBA Teams as a collective
bargaining unit were consistent with the NLRA guidelines, the court
noted that the only remaining basis for the Players' claim was that the
multi-employer bargaining organization itself was illegal.85 In re-
sponse, the court found the decisive fact to be the holding of the
United States Supreme Court in NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union
No. 449 (Buffalo Linen).8 6 In Buffalo Linen, the Supreme Court spe-
cifically upheld multi-employer bargaining on the ground that Con-
gress expressly considered its propriety and resolved that it should be
allowed. 7 Buffalo Linen involved a multi-employer association of
eight employers who were horizontal competitors for labor in the linen
services industry. In the course of negotiating a new agreement with
the association, the union went on strike against one of the employers.
In response, the other seven employers locked out their union employ-
ees.88 The National Labor Relations Board held that the lockout was
justified as a reasonable measure to preserve multi-employer bargain-
ing against the threat of being forced into submission one-by-one.8 9
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Labor Board, hold-
ing the preservation of the integrity of multi-employer bargaining did
not justify a lockout. The Supreme Court unanimously reversed, hold-
ing that Congress expressly intended that multiemployer bargaining be
allowed and that the Labor Board had the discretion to hold as it did.
Speaking for the Supreme Court, Justice Brennan stated "the ultimate
problem [of labor relations] is the balancing of the conflicting legiti-
mate interests [of unions and employers]. The function of striking that
balance to effectuate national labor policy is often a difficult and deli-
cate responsibility, which the Congress committed primarily to the
National Labor Relations Board, subject to limited judicial review."9
Supported by the Supreme Court holding, the appellate court
found that the controlling authority, as articulated in Buffalo Linen,
"simply cannot be reconciled with appellants' antitrust claim."91 The
facts in that case plainly involved conduct [price-fixing, joint boycott]
which, under classic antitrust principles, would constitute per se viola-
tions of the Sherman Act.92 Nevertheless, the holding not only
permitted such conduct, it also decisivly illustrated Congress' consid-
85. 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 1531 at *23.
86. 353 U.S. 87 (1957).
87. Id. at 95-96.
88. 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 1531 at *24.
89. Id.
90. Buffalo Linen, 353 U.S. at 94-96.
91. 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 1531 at *27.
92. Id.
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eration of multiemployer bargaining, and concluded that these prac-
tices were to be left solely to the limitations of federal labor laws as
interpreted by the National Labor Relations Board.93
The court then addressed the attempt by the Players to diminish
the applicability of Buffalo Linen to the case at bar. In oral argument,
the Players sought to distinguish Buffalo Linen on the ground that it
dealt solely with issues related to the use of economic force.94 The
court stated that such a reading of that decision was "simply unsup-
portable.'9 5 Indeed, the suggested distinction between the employers
proposing terms and conditions of employment and employers resort-
ing to economic force to support those proposals was a contradiction
to appellants' antitrust claim.96 A cartel that proposes common terms
hardly ceases to be a cartel when it resorts to economic force to en-
force those terms. If anything, the resort to economic force enhances
rather than diminishes the effect on competition.
97
The court concluded its discussion of the case at bar by citing as
persuasive authority the decision in Powell v. National Football
League,98 and applied the reasoning to the instant case. In Powell, the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the non-statutory labor ex-
emption precluded antitrust challenge to various terms and conditions
of employment implemented after impasse by National Football
League teams who had bargained in good faith with the players' union
over terms and conditions of employment. 99 The Eighth Circuit noted
that once a collective bargaining relationship was established, the pol-
icies of federal labor laws controlled, and that labor law provided the
parties with the necessary rules and remedies to settle any disputes. 100
In agreeing with Powell, the court stated that if it were to adopt
the appellants' claim, it would thereby prevent employers in all indus-
tries from engaging in multi-employer bargaining practices with em-
ployee unions.10' Employers would be prevented from maintaining
the status quo after expiration of a labor agreement and before bar-
gaining to an impasse. Thereafter, employers could not implement
new terms and conditions after impasse without fear of antitrust sanc-
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 1531 at *27.
96. Id.
97. Id. at *27-*28.
98. 930 F.2d at 1303.
99. Id. at 1303-1304.
100. Id. at 1302-1303.
101. 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 1531 at *29.
[Vol. 11
NBA v. WILLIAMS
tions.1°2 This, the court concluded, "is not collective bargaining as
intended by Congress. Indeed, it is not bargaining at all."'" 3
IV. CONCLUSION
On January 24, 1995, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit held that the antitrust laws do not prohibit employers
from bargaining jointly with an employee union, from implementing
their collective proposals in the absence of, or as a result of an expired
CBA, or from using economic force in support of such proposals.
Furthermore, any and all limits which were to be applied to multi-
employer bargaining would be found in the federal labor laws."° The
court added only that this was not necessarily a case where two wholly
inconsistent statutory schemes (antitrust and labor) might be recon-
ciled only by a judicial holding that one trumps the other. As the
court's discussion of the antitrust laws indicated, there appeared to
have been a long-standing if unspoken assumption that multi-em-
ployer collective bargaining was not subject to the antitrust laws
largely for the reasons stated in Buffalo Linen'05 and Bonanno
Linen.10 6 Finally, the court held that any doubts which may have ex-
isted about this long-standing assumption were erased by the passage
of federal labor laws.'0 7
102. Id.
103. Id. at *29-*30.
104. Id. at *30.
105. 353 U.S. 87, 94-96.
106. See supra notes 45-47.
107. 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 1531 at *30.
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